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This paper is an analysis of the South African Collective Investment Schemes (CIS) performance fee 
structure. The paper looks at the methods used in the calculation of performance fees and provides a 
detailed breakdown of their implementation in the South African CIS industry. With the aim to show 
and explain the various performance fee structures that are currently in place in the South African CIS 
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Part One  
1. Research Question 
 
This research paper attempts to explain and demonstrate the numerous performance fee methods 
and structures currently used by South African Collective Investment Schemes industry (CIS). A 
thorough analysis has been performed and presented. With the research question being:  
 
1. Which South African CIS have elected a form of performance fee compensation? 
2. Of those that have elected to do so, what structure of calculation have the put in place? 
 
The question of whether a performance fee structure is fair to an investor will be considered and 
analysed and a discussion on the use of performance fees as options for an investor on the funds 
performance will also be provided.    
 
2. Literature review 
 
Performance fee incentives in Mutual Funds1 have a number of aspects that require careful 
consideration when assessing, not just their relevance, but also their implementation into these funds. 
Should a performance-based incentive be present in mutual funds? If so, which form should it take?  
There have been a number of academic discussions looking at both of these aspects.  
 
Performance Fee Incentives and Mutual Funds.  
 
The most significant discussion regarding performance fees and mutual funds is the paper titled 
“Incentive Fees and Mutual Funds”, by E.J. Elton, M.J. Gruber and C.R. Blake, published in The 
Journal of Finance (2003). The paper concludes that mutual funds that employ performance fees do 
not, on average, earn positive (or negative) performance fees as they do not consistently outperform 
their benchmarks, however it was found that mutual funds with performance fee structures in place 
had lower Total Expense Ratios (TER) than those mutual funds without a performance fee structure. 
They also found that mutual funds with performance fee structures exhibited better stock picking 
abilities, as well as better risk-adjusted returns, which is concluded to be higher because of better 
fund management performance as the performance fee incentive results in attracting managers who 
are more skilled or who will exert more effort than those who are attracted to funds without 
performance fees.  
 
The paper found that on average, performance fee funds take on more risk than non-performance fee 
funds and that a fund manager will increase risk after a period of poor performance and decrease it 
after a period of good performance. They concluded that a sophisticated investor is better off buying 
funds with performance fees than buying funds with no performance fees (Elton, 2003). 
                                                     






In Danilo Drago, Valter Lazzari & Marco Navone’s 2010 paper Mutual Fund Incentive Fees: 
Determinants and Effects they highlight that the American mutual fund industry is not an ideal data set 
to study as the Investment Company Act of 1970 made it illegal for a mutual fund to charge 
asymmetrical fees. Asymmetrical fee structures are one sided bonus incentives where only upside 
performance is received. With this structure there would be no reduction in fees should the fund 
manager underperform their benchmark.  This fee structure takes the form on an option on positive 
performance of the fund and can ultimately be seen as a bonus on positive performance. The 
alternative structure of symmetrical fees is more commonly known as a Fulcrum fee structure.  As the 
take up by American mutual fund managers to use any form of incentive based fee is significantly 
small, a more conclusive study needed to be performed on an alternative market. Drago, Lazzari and 
Navone argue that this is that of Italian mutual fund market, as they are “free from relevant regulatory 
constraints on any compensation scheme fund managers might set” and as a result provide an 
environment where asymmetrical incentive fee structures are “a typical element of mutual fund 
compensation.” (Drago, 2010) 
 
Their study on the Italian mutual fund industry finds that there is no evidence to support the 
hypothesis that incentive fee provisions serve as a signaling tool to differentiate strong managers from 
under or poor performing managers. This result was supported by a 2007 Grant Thornton study of 
United Kingdom mutual funds, which concluded that the inclusion of a performance fee compensation 
method provided little evidence of manager outperformance compared to those funds with fixed fees. 
(Grant Thornton, 2008) 
 
Drago et al, finds that performance fee structures tend to be elected by the Investment Companies2 
(ICs) as strategic pricing policies rather than as an independent fund decision and that funds that are 
established in periods of strong market performance are more likely to have a performance fee 
structure in place.  Which they assume to be due to the investor being less concerned about the cost 
structure of the funds. (Drago, 2010). In a further study by Apa and Griffith (1998) they further provide 
results that the selling expense of a mutual fund does not have a significant correlation with excess 
return or total return of that fund. 
 
Other important discussions on performance fees include the paper “Performance Fees for 
Investment Management”, by L.E. Davanzo and S.L. Nesbitt, published in The Financial Analysts 
Journal (1987), which discusses the history of performance fees and the general concepts thereof. In 
a South African context, J.C. Schreuder’s 2006, paper titled “Performance-Based Investment 
Management Fees, A South African Perspective”, examines basic performance fee concepts and 
applies them to a South African environment. He analyses methods of calculating performance fees 
for single strategy and fund of funds investors. Lastly, he examines the issue of performance fee 
valuation. Schreuder concludes his paper by providing his thoughts on performance fee fairness 
                                                     





between investors and fund managers, he states that “it would be difficult to prove that performance 
fees offer greater fairness than fixed rate fees” but that they do attempt to “charge an investor for the 
fund managers skill in a more efficient way.” The level of fairness according to Schreuder is based on 
symmetry, in particular symmetry of knowledge and the transparency of all the methods of fee 
calculation. (Schreuder, 2006)    
 
L.T. Starks, in The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (1987), titled “Performance 
Incentive Fees: An Agency Theoretic Approach”, published an in-depth study focusing on 
performance fees and their alignment of interests between fund managers and investors. She found 
that when the performance benchmark is the market portfolio, optimal symmetric performance fee 
schedules eliminate potential agency problems. When the manager’s only decision is to select the 
portfolio’s risk level, the optimal symmetric performance contract will provide the appropriate 
incentives for selecting the investors desired risk level. On the other hand, if the manager’s decisions 
include the amount of resources to expend on managing the portfolio, the agency problem is not 
eliminated by the symmetric performance fee schedule. The portfolio manager will always choose a 
lesser of resources amount than the individual investor would desire (Stark, 1987). The promotion of 
performance fees as method to provide shared incentives between fund managers and investors is 
therefore flawed in the vast majority of performance fee structures as will be demonstrated in this 
paper.  
Measurement of Mutual Fund Performance 
 
Performance fees are an attempt to provide an investor with the best possible returns (risk adjusted 
returns), through incentivizing a fund manager. It is therefore important to be able compare a fund’s 
performance to that of other possible investment opportunities. For mutual funds a benchmark is an 
important tool to compare a fund’s performance to that of its peers (these would be considered funds 
that have similar investment and risk mandates). As mutual funds are grouped into numerous 
investment classifications a suitable benchmark allocated to each specific classification allows for a 
comparable measurement of performance to be established. A benchmark index allows investors to 
see the passive or market return of a mutual fund.   
 
There are a number of measurement models that look at comparing the returns of a Mutual Fund to 
that of a benchmark index. A number of these methods of assessment are based on the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM), which looks at the relationship between risk and expected return of an asset.  
 
The Treynor model (1965) looks at the volatility of the funds returns with respect to the market return. 
This measures the excess return that has been earned by the fund portfolio compared to the market 
portfolio adjusting for risk. The Sharpe model (1966) builds on to the Treynor model idea of excess 
return however this model looks at the excess return per unit of total risk compared to the benchmark 
return. The Jensen model or Jensen’s alpha (1968) is concerned with the difference between the 






These three methods of evaluation are seen as the core evaluation tools for mutual funds. There are 
however a number of other methods of evaluation, such as Multi Beta Models like the Arbitrage 
Pricing Model and the Multifactor model, which are both expansions on the CAPM model. Market 
Price based models and Accounting Information models are other such methods of portfolio theory 
assessment tools.  
 
Studies however have found that there is a high correlation between the multi-factor models and the 
three CAPM models, US market (Simons 1998), Italy (Basso and Funari 2001). This indicates that for 
a basic understanding of relative return performance the CAPM methods, particularly Jensen’s alpha 
can still provide the best method of assessment.  
 
The ability to compare the risk-adjusted performance of a fund to that of a benchmark and other 
similar funds allows investors to ascertain the true value added the fund manager has provided. A 
conclusion on a fund managers compensation based on this performance is more easily digested 
when a suitable benchmark is available.   
 
Benchmark Selection for Performance Fees 
 
As performance fees are based on a fund’s returns relative to a specified benchmark it is important 
that the impact of a benchmark to the fees received is evaluated (Horan, 2008). In Jeffery Baileys 
paper Evaluating Benchmark Quality he lists several criteria to evaluate a benchmarks suitability: 
 
- The Benchmark should contain a high proportion of the securities represented in the 
managed portfolio 
- The proportion of the benchmarks market value allocated to purchases during 
rebalancing, should be low  
- The manager’s active position as defined by the benchmark (the managed portfolios 
allocation to a security less the weight of the security in the benchmark) should be 
mostly positive.  
- The benchmarks percentage allocations to securities should represent investable 
position sizes, given the managers total assets 
- The variability of the managers active return as measured against the benchmark 
should be lower than the active return as measured against a market portfolio  
- The correlation between the extra-market returns of the managed portfolio and those of 
the benchmark, which relates the managers performance adjusted for the market to the 
benchmarks performance measured against the market, should be significantly positive, 
at the same time  
- The correlation between the extra-market returns of the benchmark and the managed 





- The style exposures of the managed portfolio and the benchmark as defined by a 
multifactor risk model should be the similar (Bailey 1992).  
  
It is important that the benchmark not only incorporates those assets the manager invests but also the 
risk characteristics of the assets. Performance evaluation theory stresses the importance of using 
good benchmarks (Holmstrom 1979) and as a consequence in the US funds are required by the SEC 
to provide their returns alongside the returns of a passive benchmark index (Sensoy 2008). The same 
is true with South African CIS who provide a benchmark index as detailed by The Association for 
Savings and Investment South Africa (ASISA). In both these countries and around the world it is not 
the regulating body that chooses which benchmark is used, but rather up to the manager to select the 
most suitable index. The suitability of the performance indicator can be questioned and whether or not 
they are actually suitable. Fama and French (1992) discuss how a benchmark must be defined by 
value/growth as they are associated with average returns and return covariances. Therefore for a 
funds benchmark to be maximally useful it needs to match the funds exposure to size and 
value/growth factors, however this is not often the case. (Sensoy, 2008) 
 
The use of an inappropriate or even just a poorly suited performance benchmark allows for strategic 
advantages, such as improving investor flows (Sensoy 2008). In this paper looking at performance 
fees it is also important to consider the performance fee benchmark (also known as the fee hurdle) 
alongside the benchmark. The use of a poorly fitting fee benchmark will allow a manager to receive 
compensation for a real return that was not accurate. If the chosen fee benchmark were too low this 
would reward the fund manager for average returns. A performance fee is the reward of a funds alpha 
(return above the benchmark), so a poorly fitted benchmark would provide an inaccurate alpha and 
ultimately reward the fund manager for returns that did not accurately capture the true value added.   
 
An example of this might be a fixed interest fund, where the benchmark might be the all bond index, 
and yet the mandate of the fund allows the fund manager to invest in more high-risk credit 
instruments, thus earning a performance fee for performance attained by holding riskier off 
benchmark investments. 
 
The chosen benchmark is too low: which encourages the fund manager to take on extra risk in order 
to earn performance fees. Ultimately, too much risk will be disallowed by regulatory authorities, or the 
extra risk may implode, leading to capital loss. However, very few managers actually take on too 
much risk, as investors will sell out. Furthermore, the high water mark (discussed further on) shortfall 
will be much higher and it will take longer to recover. Knowing this, performance fees are more likely 
to encourage fund managers to be more conservative as they are afraid to lose much more ground 






V = value of incentive fee
= participation in incremental return
X1 = value of portfolio
X2 = value of benchmark
= standard deviation
= standard deviation
𝜌 = correlation between porfolio and benchmark     
T = measurment period
N( ) = cumulative normal density function
It is therefore important to highlight that the performance relative to a benchmark is not necessarily an 
indicator of manager skill, as the construction of assets may differ between the fund and the stated 
benchmark. (Admati, 1997). 
 
It is important to note that benchmarks do not include fees, expenses and trading costs, which are 
incurred by mutual funds. (Daniel, 1997) 
 
Valuing Performance Fees as an Option 
 
In Drago (et al) paper Mutual Fund Incentive Fees: Determinants and Effects they mention how 
asymmetrical performance fees can be seen as an option on a mutual fund’s performance. This 
concept was studied by Mark Kritzman in the Financial Analysis Journal titled “Incentive Fees: Some 
Problems and Some Solutions” (1987). He describes how the manager has the luxury of receiving the 
upside of performance through the payment of the performance fee and the protection of the 
downside with the security of the base fee. Kritzman based his article on the ideas of W. Margrabe, 
who first discussed the possibility of valuing performance fees as an option; Kritzman, however, 
removed the idea that the fund manager would have to reimburse fees to the client, should the 
portfolio underperform the benchmark. Kritzman makes two distinctions between the standard Black-
Scholes option valuation method, and the valuation of performance fees as an option:  
Firstly, the value of the option does not depend on the risk of the portfolio, but rather the net risk of the 
portfolio and the benchmark. It is important to measure not only the variance of the portfolio but also 
the variance of the benchmark and the correlation between the two.  
 
Secondly, normal option pricing utilises the risk-free rate; however for a performance fee to occur, the 
benchmark must be achieved, therefore in this case there is no risk-free rate. Kritzman then proposed 
an adjusted formula for the pricing of a performance fee as an option, in which the risk-free rate is 
removed and the variance of the portfolio now consists of the variance of the portfolio and the hurdle 
(known as the tracking error), as well as the correlation between the two. Hence, he arrives at the 
following formulation for pricing performance fees as options, where: 
 
 
In Kritzman’s paper, he gives an example using the following diagram to highlight whether the option 
of the performance fee was under or overvalued, and hence whether the manager should charge a 
higher base fee, or a lower fee with the performance fee option:  
𝑽 =  𝜹[𝑿𝟏𝑵 𝒅𝟏 − X2N(d2)]
d1 =
𝒍𝒏 𝑿𝟏𝑿𝟐
+ 𝟏𝟐  𝝈𝟏
𝟐+ 𝝈𝟐𝟐−𝟐𝝆𝝈𝟏𝝈𝟐 𝑻
𝝈𝟏𝟐+ 𝝈𝟐𝟐−𝟐𝝆𝝈𝟏𝝈𝟐 𝟏 𝟐⁄ 𝑻








Kritzman described a fund with a value of $10 million, and calculated using the Black-Scholes option 
valuation method the value of the option to be 0.189%, or roughly $18 900. He then calculates that if 
a manager usually charges $50 000 (0.5%) for the base fee, then the base fee adjusted for the 
performance fee option should be reduced to $31 100. It is with this value as the base that we can 
evaluate if the fund manager under or overvalues the option. In his example he states that, should the 
manager set the base fee higher than the $31 100, he would then be undervaluing the option as he 
would look to be receiving a total fee higher than that of the flat fee (i.e. no performance fee); the 
converse is obviously when the manager charges a base fee below the standard $31 100 level, as in 
this instance, the manager is overvaluing the performance fee option. 
 
Martin Lee Director of Quantitative Fixed Income Research at Citigroup presented a short report 
Simulation Analyses of Performance-Based Fees in this report he discussed the further complications 
with valuing performance fees as options. When valuing performance fees as an option the volatility 
of returns is captured as the tracking error of the fund to that of the fee benchmark. Therefore the 
higher the tracking error the higher the volatility and ultimately the higher the value of the option will 
be. Lee then explains that because the downside volatility of performance fees are protected by the 
minimum base fee charged. There are a very small number of funds that do provide a fee rebate 
should the fund underperform however this is not the norm both in South Africa and internationally. A 
limit to downside volatility therefore incentives the manager to increase his risk.  
It is common for funds to offer a maximum performance fee, the inclusion of a “fee cap” results in is 
equivalent to selling the investor a call option, with the strike at the maximum fee level. The incentive 
for a manager to increase his portfolio risk is therefore reduced. As an option moves closer to maturity 
Flat Fee versus Base Fee plus Option Value of Incentive Fee



















or termination, there will be an incentive for a manager already operating “in the money” to not 
increase the portfolios risk.  
Lee runs a number of models based on specified parameters3 Please see below for his results4 for 
the average annual fee base for funds with A) No performance fee, B) Performance fee but no cap, C) 








When assessing performance fees as options it is important to consider managers acting in their own 
interest and “gaming” risks in order to either lock in profit when performance is good, or increase risk 
when performance has been poor in an attempt to make some form of performance fee. Lee has 
looked at this factor assigning weighted risk factors depending on positive or negative returns as well 
as how long these returns continue. Based on this factor the average fee charged increases by 3%.  
 
 
Finally he looked at funds that ran with High water mark structures, this he found had the most 
significant impact on average fee calculations with the probability of only being paid the base fee 
increasing from 32% to 38%  
 
                                                     
3 Please see appendix 1.1 for breakdown. 














PBF Formula and High Water Mark 
Impact of High Water Mark Condition on PBF Formula 
PBF PBF PBF PBF 
Evaluation Metric (w/o termination (w/o termination (wI termination (wI termination 
& no fee cap) & 80bps fee cap) & nafee cap) & 80bps fee cap 
Without High Water Mark 
Avg. AnnuaIFee(PV) 
0.58 0.46 0.41 0.33 (in bps of initial value) 
Yearly Avg. Fee (%) 0.54 0.43 0.54 0.43 
(non-terminated periods) 
Std Dev Yearly Fee (%) 0.48 0.29 0.48 0.29 
% Prob. of Base Fees Only 32 32 32 32 
With High Water Mark 
Ann Avg PV of Fees 
0.47 0.39 0.36 0.30 
{in b~s of initial value) 
Year Avg. Fee (%) 0.44 0.36 0.48 0.39 
(non-terminated periods) 
Std Dev Yearly Fee (%) 0.47 0.29 0.47 0.29 





Part Two  
1. Collective Investment Schemes (CIS)  
 
A Collective Investment Scheme (CIS) is a trust based scheme that comprises of a pool of assets that 
are managed by a CIS fund manager. CIS are a popular form of investment, as they are easily 
accessible to all investors. Each investor has a proportional stake in the CIS portfolio based on how 
much money he or she has contributed. In South Africa CIS are also commonly referred to as Unit 
trusts. The word “unit” refers to the portion or part of the CIS portfolio that is owned by the investor. 
The “trust” is the financial instrument that is created in order to manage the investment. The trust 
structure enables financial experts known as fund managers to invest the money on behalf of the CIS 
investor. CIS provide a relatively secure means of investing in a securities exchange, or other 
financial instruments. An individual investing in the securities exchange or money markets is faced 
with a number of expense barriers. With a CIS, the money or funds from a group of investors are 
pooled or collected together to form a CIS portfolio and ultimately spread the cost of investing. (ASISA 
– Facts on Collective Investment portfolios, 2012)  
 
Currently there are five different types of CIS5:  
 
• CIS in securities (the portfolio consists mainly of securities and includes all local and foreign 
funds registered with the Financial Services Board (FSB). Most collective investment 
schemes fall in this category.)  
• CIS in properties (The portfolio consists mostly of property shares)  
• CIS in participation bonds (The portfolio consist mainly of participation mortgage bonds.)  
• Declared CIS (Any scheme the Finance Minister declares a CIS)  
• Foreign CIS (Foreign schemes that solicit investments from South Africans and are not 
registered with the FSB)  
 
CIS consist of a pool of various individual investors funds, it is then through the CIS that the fund 
manager purchases an investment portfolio. An investment portfolio consists of a wide a variation of 
financial instruments such as bonds, equities, money market securities, etc.  
2. Classification of Collective investment schemes 
 
CIS funds are placed into specific classifications in order to (ASISA 2012): 
 
• promote investor awareness and understanding of the various fund types; 
                                                     
5 According to the Collective Investment Schemes Control act no 45 of 2002 (Republic of South Africa - Government Gazette, Vol 450 





• assist investors in selecting funds; 
• facilitate the comparison of funds both across and within categories; 
• facilitate the analysis of different types of funds.  
 
Once a fund is classified it is required to follow a set of investment rules, known as the investment 
mandate, which dictate the class of assets the fund is allowed to hold, these are usually defined in 
percentage terms, for example an equity fund is required to always hold at least 80% of its portfolio 
value in equity.  
 
For South African CIS classification the first criteria of classification is the domicile of the fund’s 
assets. This is split between South African, Worldwide, Global and Regional portfolios.  
 
A. South African CIS are deemed as those that hold a minimum of 70% investment in 
South African assets. 
B. Worldwide CIS are funds that invest across borders; there is no limit to geographical 
exposure for these funds.  
C. Global CIS have 80% of their investments outside of South Africa, with no more than 
80% of their exposure to assets to a specific geographical region. 
D. Regional CIS have 80% of their investments outside of South Africa, in one specific 
geographical region. 
 
The second criteria is based on the asset allocation of the portfolio investments. CIS are split into four 
investment categories:  
 
1. Equity portfolios are CIS that invest in equity shares through the Johannesburg 
Securities exchange (JSE). Equity CIS must hold a minimum of 75% of their market 
value of their portfolio in equity shares.  
2. Multi asset Portfolios are able to invest across the board and create portfolios holding 
equity, bonds, money market and property holdings.  
3. Interest bearing Portfolios may only invest in bonds, money market securities or fixed 
income earning securities  
4. Real Estate Portfolio are schemes that make investments in listed property shares, they 
must hold at least 50% exposure to real estate securities at all times.  
 
The third tier of investment mandate further classifies funds according to their investment focus based 
on the following: sector; equity holding; return objectives or more specific instrument holdings. The 







For a further detailed breakdown of each fund classification please see Appendix 2.  
CIS schemes Benchmarks  
 
The JSE makes use of the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB), a worldwide but not fully standard 
approach to benchmark classification. The ICB sets out a specific benchmark portfolio based on the 
sector of investment. The aim of this is to be able to compare similar funds to one another as well as 
providing a standard base level of expected performance (the benchmark). In South Africa specific 





Classes of CIS investment units 
There are two distinct types of CIS investors: retail investors and institutional investors. A retail 
investor is usually an individual who invests for his or her own personal account. Whereas an 
institutional investor is a financial institution such as a bank, pension fund, another CIS, etc. Who 
makes large investments on behalf of their clients.  
 
Due to the size of institutional investments they are usually able to receive a discount on the fees 
charged by the CIS, it is for this reason that separate classes of investment units are established. 
Which are most often based on investment size. Currently funds can have two types of units or 
classes6, (ASISA – Facts on Collective Investment portfolios, 2012).  
 
 
• Class A: retail class of investments for the sale of new or additional CIS units.  
 
• Class B: institutional class, specifically for new or additional investments by large institutional 
investors, with stringent entry criteria. 
 
The different fee structures for the two classes are clearly defined in the fund fact sheet as well as the 
initially fee disclosure form provided by the asset manager.  
 
Single Strategy and Funds of Funds 
CIS that invest direct into the instruments available to them through their mandate are known as 
Single Strategy funds (SS). CIS that invest into a number of CIS are known as Funds of Funds, as the 
name makes mention these CIS are comprised of a number of underlying single strategy funds that 
are then used as a portfolio.   
                                                     
6 Any fund launched prior to June 1998 was not allowed to charge more than a 1% annual fee and 5% initial fee, these funds are now 





3. The South African Environment  
 
The South African Collective Investment industry was established in June 1965 with the launch of the 
South African growth equity fund (SAGE), which had an initial Net Asset Value of R600 000 (Petit, 
2007). 
Asset Management Firms 
 
The South African CIS industry has a large number of Investment Companies (IC’s), as of June 2013 
there were 43 unique CIS managers offering between them 1023 retail and institutional funds, with an 
asset value of R1.3 trillion. The large number of IC’s does however not translate into a large spread of 
assets. The top 20 Asset managers hold a little over 97% of the assets under administration for CIS, 
leaving 23 asset managers looking at sharing the remaining 3%.  
 
The ten largest IC’s by funds size and market share percentage are, Investec (R172bn, 12.68%), 
Stanlib (R157bn, 11.59%), Allan Gray (R142bn, 10.46%), Coronation (R133bn, 9.78%), Nedgroup 
(R130bn, 9.57%), Old Mutual (R120bn, 8.89%), Absa (R95bn, 7.00%), Sanlam (R80bn, 5.84%), 







1st Tier – Domicile of Assets 
 
According to the geographical classification, there are 873 funds (86%) that are considered domestic, 
41 funds (4%) worldwide, 20 funds regional (2%) and 87 (8%) global. So the vast majority of CIS 
based in South Africa invest in South African assets. In terms of asset value the split is even higher in 
favour of domestic investments R1 238bn (93%), worldwide R15bn (1%), regional R13bn (1%) and 
foreign R66bn (5%).  
 
 
2nd Tier - Asset Allocation 
In terms of asset type of investment the South African CIS split according on number of funds is: 
Equity funds (26%), Multi Asset funds (58%), Interest Bearing funds (12%)7 and Real estate funds 
(4%). Based on asset value: Equity funds (20%), Multi Asset funds (43%), Interest bearing funds 
(32%) and Real estate funds (4%). The larger proportion held by Interest bearing funds based on 
asset value rather than number of funds is due to the large capital investments needed in interest 
bearing funds. 
                                                     






3rd Tier – Asset Focus 
 
The third tier of CIS classification splits funds according to their sector, equity holding, return 
objectives or specific instrument holdings. Based on this classification the asset values of the four 
sectors are show in the graphs below.  
 





4. Regulation of Collective Investment Schemes  
Financial Services Board (FSB) 
 
The regulatory body for South African Collective Investment schemes is the Financial Services Board 
(FSB). The FSB is an independent institution that oversees the non-banking financial services 
industry in South Africa. The function of the board is as follows: 
 
1. to supervise the compliance with laws regulating financial institutions and the provision of 
financial services;  
2. to advise the Finance Minister on matters concerning financial institutions and financial 
services, either of its own accord or at the request of the Minister; and  
3. to promote programs and initiatives by financial institutions and bodies representing the 
financial services industry to inform and educate users and potential users of financial 
products and services. (FSB, 2012) 
 
CIS companies are required to send details of their portfolios to the FSB, every three months, as well 
as an annual report. The purpose of this monitoring is to check that management companies are not 
falsifying their performance, that fund managers are investing within their mandates, and that liquidity 
levels are not breached for prolonged periods of time. Management companies are therefore 
accountable to their investors, their trustees and the FSB.  
 
The FSB has passed a number of acts which consolidate statutory and legal requirements across the 
financial services sector, and which extend the FSB’s regulatory powers to many investment 
‘schemes’ that previously escaped the regulatory net. Namely: 
 
FAIS – The Financial and Intermediary Services Act: This regulates any person or company who 
sells, gives advice on, or manages any investment product. 
 
CISCA - The Collective Investment Schemes Act: This regulates any investment scheme, which 
seeks to attract multiple investors into a single managed vehicle. 
 
FICA – The Financial Intelligence Act: Policed by the Treasury as opposed to the FSB, this act 
requires any financial services provider to satisfactorily identify and ‘know’ their clients, and obliges 
them to report any (even possibly) suspicious activity that might contravene SA’s money laundering 







The Association for Savings and Investment South Africa (ASISA) 
 
The Association for Savings and Investment South Africa (ASISA) was formed in 2008. It is an 
amalgamation of four former associations: the Association of Collective Investments (ACI), the 
Investment Management Association of South Africa (IMASA), the Linked Investment Service 
Provider Association (LISPA) and the Life Offices’ Association (LOA). ASISA represents the majority 
of South Africa’s asset managers, collective incentive scheme management companies, linked 
investment service providers, multi-managers, and life insurance companies. (ASISA, 2010) 
Compliance with the ASISA Guidelines is voluntary but strongly encouraged.  
 
The ASISA is responsible for the collective investment industry standards of transparency and 
accountability, mandates, fund classification and reporting standards for collective investments8. 




                                                     
8 The original codes, standards and guidelines for Collective Investment Schemes have been inherited from the Association of Collective 





5. Fees for CIS 
 
As CIS have two investor classes based on the investor type (Class A: retail and Class B: 
institutional). The specific fees charged by the asset manager are dependent on the class of the 
investment. CIS are required to fully disclose all the fees charged.  There are three different charges 
an investor can incur when entering a fund.   
Asset Manager Costs 
 
A. Once-off Entry Costs: also known as initial fees, are charged to an investor when they enter 
into a fund. This can be a specific fixed lump sum or a certain percentage of the initial 
investment. The entry fee is normally accredited to the asset manager’s administration and 
marketing costs.9 The fee is charged in the form of reduced units of purchase.10 
Internationally the trend is not to charge an initial fee and a number of South African CIS’s 
follow this.  
 
B. Annual Costs: are charged as a percentage of the value of the investment. They can be a 
standard fixed yearly percentage of the investor’s holdings, alternatively, as per the topic of 
this paper, they can fluctuate according to the fund’s performance.  
Intermediary Costs  
 
If the investor has purchased units in the fund indirectly through a third party, they may be liable to 
pay a fee to this third party. This can be a once-off entry fee or a continual yearly fee.  
Financial Advisors Costs 
 
A financial advisor may charge a fee as compensation for his advice, A fee for advising the investor 
which fund to invest into. This again can be a percentage of the investment, usually only a once-off 
charge however.  
6. Total Expense Ratio (TER) 
 
Collective Investments are required to disclose their Total Expense Ratios (TER’s) in order to provide 
full transparency of fund expenses as well as evaluate the effect of expenses on an investment. The 
TER measure is used globally to measure the impact of management and operating expenses 
deducted from a fund’s portfolio. It gives an indication of the drag effect these expenses have on the 
                                                     
9 Note that a 14% VAT is levied on top of all the fee charges  
10 The fee is charged in the form of reduced units of purchase, i.e. if 1 unit of the fund costs R1 and there is an initial charge of R100. 





return you ultimately receive from your investment. Expressed as a percentage, a fund’s TER is 
calculated by dividing the portfolio costs by the market value of the fund11. 
 
According to ACI Standard12 the following costs must be included in the TER calculation: 
 
• Management fees (including performance fees) 
• Fixed operating costs:  
o Custody and Trustee fees 
o Audit fees 
o Bank charges, other than those charged by an investor’s bank 
• Value Added Taxes 
• Liquidity costs:  
o Net negative interest charges (this is applicable in the unlikely event of a fund owing 
interest to a bank as a result of temporary liquidity pressure) 
• For investments in other funds:  
o Weighted portion of the underlying portfolio’s TER (for funds of funds) 
o Upfront fees 
o Exit fees or reduction of redemption 
• Where income is earned by the providers of scrip lending services and if this income is not 
passed back to the portfolio, such an amount that is retained by the provider must be 
included.  
 
Charges not included in a TER are generally of a once-off nature and deducted from a client’s 
investment as opposed to the underlying portfolio, these include: initial charges (including 
commission); annual adviser fees agreed upon by the adviser and client; stockbroker fees; expenses 
relating to the settling of transactions and taxes associated with these.   
  
Subject to the provisions of the ACI Standard on TER’s, the actual performance fee earned by the 
manager in each period must be reflected in the TER for that class, while the performance fee must 
be disclosed separately. This is to enable investors to distinguish between costs that may be charged 
to a portfolio regardless of its performance and a performance fee that may vary significantly from one 
year to the next. The cost of the performance fee, in rand terms, will be disclosed as a percentage of 
the average net asset value of the portfolio. In addition, for uncapped performance fees, the highest 
total TER since the inception of TER must be disclosed.  
  
                                                     
11 The fund’s market value (total assets) is the daily average value of the portfolio over a specific period (e.g. financial year). 





Part Three  
1.Performance Fees 
 
According to the National Treasury’s technical discussion paper Charges in South African retirement 
funds (July 2013) roughly 20% of South African unit trusts have some form of performance fee 
structure in place. Those in favour of performance fees promote to investors that such a structure will 
align their returns with that of the Asset Managers and will result in a “win-win” situation for both 
parties.  
 
As professional Fund Managers actively manage CIS, in theory they should be able to generate 
greater fund returns than those of passive funds that follow indices and benchmarks (Rusconi, 2008). 
The excess return a Fund Manager provides to that of the benchmark index is known as alpha. The 
core concept of performance fees is to provide a structure to reward a Fund Manager for the alpha 
they have returned to the investor, ultimately providing a performance sharing incentive. The majority 
of South African CIS have a fixed rate fee structure, which is driven by the total funds assets under 
administration (AUM) rather than the funds performance.  
 
As the incentive for excess return is diminished for fixed fee funds they can become asset gathers 
who focus on total asset growth rather than fund performance (Cameron, 2007) and although past 
performance plays a significant role in determining future investor flows this is not the only criteria 
used by investors when they are evaluating a CIS, such as: 
 
• The IC brand and reputation, rather than the underlying CIS selection.  
• Financial Advisor and IC collaboration  
• Cross product selling. An investor with a retail bank account may be more likely to 
purchase their CIS through that bank as they are offered easy payment methods. (Less 
FICA responsibilities, direct debit set up already) 
 
Performance fees provide a means to ensure that CIS are not solely driven by investor flows and that 
there is some form of shared performance incentive. The use of shared incentives through a 
quantifiable method (performance fees) provides investors assurance that the asset manager is 
acting in their own best interest. A performance fee allows the manager to earn superior 
compensation should they provide returns to the investor over an agreed upon benchmark. (Rusconi, 
2008) 
 
Performance based fees are promoted by investment managers as a means to align investor and 
manager interests, however the structure of the incentive fee may result in a number of negative 
incentive effects. The Charges in South African retirement funds (July 2013) working paper highlights 





rewarded, where prior or future periods of underperformance can be ignored. The structure of the 
performance fee calculation is the main issue when deciding whether performance fees favour a 
particular party or if they have a win-win scenario for both. Starks in her 1987 paper discusses how 
the structure can all too often favour the asset manager, and that a mutual beneficial arrangement 
can only be established where the measure of performance (Benchmark) is suitable. (Stark, 1987) 
 
For the Asset Manager a performance fee structure can add a substantial amount of revenue through 
to the bottom line of the company, Allan Gray announced that it earned a third of its annual income in 
2008 from performance fees (Still, 2009). Structured correctly performance fees encourage fund 
managers to act in the best interests of their clients by focusing on generating investment 
performance rather than chasing growth in fund size; and the performance fee period, usually set for 
periods of between one and three years, can best enable the fund manager’s investment ideas to be 
realised, thus creating the best chance for outperformance (Still, 2009). 
 
2. Performance fee requirements  
 
The structure of performance fees can vary widely from fund to fund based on a number of different 
characteristics. The method of implementation of performance fees is entirely up to the fund manager. 
It is however stipulated by Section 93(1)(d) of the Collective Incentive Schemes Act that: 
 
 “The manager may only recoup a service fee from the fund should the service fee have been 
disclosed prior by the manager to the prospective client (i.e. prior to investment), and the client 
agreed to the fee”  
 
It is the responsibility of the fund manager prior to the investor entering the CIS to ensure that specific 
elements of the fee calculation have been disclosed and agreed upon. They are as follows:  
 
A. Standardised terminology  
B. Standardised compulsory disclosure on all marketing material  
C. Frequently asked questions (FAQ’s) available in a public domain  
D. Total Expense Ratio (TER) 
Standardised Terminology 
A fund manager must disclose the following details of his performance fee calculation, it is also 
required that he refer to each aspect in the standardised terminology and not by any other (ASISA, 
2012).  
 






Maximum Fee: This is the maximum annual management fee that may in any instance be recovered 
from the fund by the manager. This fee includes the minimum fee and all performance fee elements. 
 
Benchmark: This is the yardstick the fund is managed to. Each fund may only have one benchmark. 
 
Fee Hurdle: This is the level of performance the fund must enjoy, prior to a fee higher than the 
Minimum Fee being charged. A fee hurdle refers to the absolute hurdle (e.g. ALSI + 2% per annum) 
and not only the threshold (e.g. 2% per annum). 
 
Sharing Rate: The percentage of outperformance in excess of the fee hurdle the manager is entitled 
to share in with the client. 
 
High Water Mark: The highest level of out-performance the fund has reached since the previous Fee 
Payment Date. 
 
Fee Accrual Frequency: This is the frequency at which provisions are made in fund prices in order to 
allow for fees in excess of the Minimum Fee. 
 
Fee Payment Frequency: This is the frequency at which the amounts provided in the fund in respect 
of fees in excess of the Minimum Fee are transferred from the fund to the manager.  
 
Performance Fee Measurement Period: The length of the period for which the fund performance is 
compared to the fee hurdle, each time the fee is accrued. 
Standardised compulsory disclosure on all marketing material  
According to the Collective Incentive Schemes act the fund manager is required to present the 
calculation of the performance fee in a defined manner to ensure that each CIS performance fee 
structure be compared. 
Frequently asked questions (FAQ’s) 
It is also required that the fund manager provide a number of detailed explanations to Frequently 
asked questions (FAQ’s) regarding the calculation of the performance fee, including scenario 
discussions (e.g. what happens if the fund returns 10%, -10% or 0%, etc.). Please see appendix 4 for 
the exact questions that must be answered in the FAQ section.  
Total Expense Ratio (TER) 
According to the collective schemes act the actual performance fee earned by the manager in each 
period must be reflected in the TER. For uncapped fees the act requires the highest TER since 
inception to be used. It is important to consider that the TER disclosed will not fully disclose the 






3. Performance Fee Structures  
Fee hurdles 
Performance fee hurdles act as the level of performance the fund must achieve in order to be eligible 
to receive a performance fee. Fee hurdles can be different to the fund’s performance benchmark, 
which acts as a risk profile on the fund. Ideally a performance fee hurdle should match the 
benchmark, but this is not always the case.  
Sharing Rate 
The sharing rate or participation rate is the percentage of performance the manager receives on the 
performance above the benchmark. The sharing rate is usually set between 10% and 20%. The value 
of the fund above the benchmark is then multiplied by the participation rate in order to calculate the 
final performance fee charged to the investors.  
Measurement Period  
1. High Water Mark (HWM) 
“A high water mark can be thought of as a measurement period since inception” (Schreuder, 2006). A 
HWM is the highest value a fund has reached in terms of return, you can look at high water marks on 
a per investor units scale, if any performance is lost the fund needs to make up that performance 







Above is a simple explanation of a vanilla HWM13. From time period 0 to 1 the fund Net Asset Value 
(NAV) is growing, the fund will earn a performance fee in this period.  
 
• At point (A) the value of the fund reaches a maximum and starts to decline. At this point (A) a 
high water mark (a) is established.  
• Between time periods 1 and 2 the fund NAV is below the High water mark (a), the grey area. 
No performance fee will be earned.  
• Between time periods 2 and 3 the fund NAV improves and exceeds the NAV established at 
High water mark (a). A performance fee will be earned.  
• At point (B) the NAV of the fund again begins to diminish, now establishing a new HWM, High 
water mark (b).  
• From time period 3 to 4 the fund NAV declines and improves but does not reach the original 
HWM NAV value, shown in the grey area. No performance fee is earned.  
• Finally at point (C), the NAV surpasses the High water mark (b) and the manager will again 
be able to claim a performance fee.  
 
It is important to note that although the fund went through periods of positive performance the fund 
was note able to charge a performance fee as the HWM had not been surpassed.  
 
In practice a fee hurdle is applied along with a HWM, this results in the HWM moving with the fee 
hurdle rate. For example, in the diagram above should High Water mark (a) be 100 if applied with a 
fee hurdle returning 5% between time period 0 and 1 then the adjusted HWM would be 105. Should 
the benchmark return a negative performance the high water mark would be adjusted downwards.  
 
A HWM ensures that any losses made by the fund manager must be made up before they can again 
receive a performance fee (Still, 2009), this is seen as more investor focused as it ensures that that 
only real positive growth is liable for a performance fee charge.  
 
There are few issues however when applying the HWM method of fee calculation, particularly when a 
fund is operating well below its HWM. A HWM that is not reset, i.e. taken back to more recent level of 
NAV, can result in the fund manager “losing interest” or more specifically acting in a more passive 
investment style. A fund manager who sees that there is a strong likelihood of not receiving a 
performance fee may be tempted to follow the benchmark or market portfolio. This would allow him to 
focus his attention elsewhere. The result would be that the investor would be paying a fund manager 
a fee (albeit excluding performance fee) for an actively managed portfolio, or alpha positive fund, 
whereby the fund would just be following a passive portfolio. Even without the performance fee the 
base charge on an actively managed portfolio is substantially higher than that of a passive index 
tracker fund. (Still 2009).   
                                                     
13 This is excluding the hurdle rate and any subscriptions and redemptions; the level of performance is based solely on the net asset value 





A fund manager that is underperforming their HWM may be enticed to “swing for the fences”. As 
standard trading at the predetermined risk levels will most likely not return a result significant enough 
to outperform the HWM, a fund manager may take on one or more risky trades in order to find an 
exceptional return that will allow them to beat the HWM. As the fund manager has no aligned 
incentive he is not concerned with the increased downside risk and the possibility of a blow out of the 
fund’s performance.   
 
There have been examples where funds have decided to reset their HWM, in 1994 Michael Steinhardt 
lost a third of his $4.5bn portfolio, considering bankruptcy he elected to reset his HWM to the new 
$3bn level, allowing him to profit $300m on the $1.5bn he would need to return to take the fund back 
to its original HWM (Zuckerman, 1995). The resetting of a HWM could be crucial for fund manager to 
stay in business, should investors still have faith in their manager and see the large gap in actual 
return and the HWM as only temporary, allowing this reset may be a sensible option in order to avoid 
the behavioral effects that can occur.   
 
The market for well-established fund managers is very competitive. A fund manager who has a small 
chance of receiving a performance fee may be incentivised to move to another fund/asset 
management firm. Where they can receive a performance bonus again. The burden of this 
performance bonus pay-out then falls on the investment company, do they pay a manger a bonus in 
order to keep them?  
2. The Rolling Return Method 
The standard HWM looks at the fund performance since inception, an alternative method of HWM 
implementation is to only consider the performance of the fund over a defined period, be it one year, 
three or five years. The rolling period method allows prior periods of poor performance to be removed 
from the performance fee calculation (Still, 2009). It looks at the return of the fund compared to the 
return of the fee hurdle over a defined period14.  
 
Schreuder discusses in his 2006 paper Performance-Based Investment Management Fees - A South 
African Perspective that the measurement period of the rolling return has an important effect on the 
performance of the fund to that of the fee hurdle. He explains that out-performance of the fund can be 
considered a random variable. The mean of return will have a lower standard deviation, the longer the 
measurement period. The greater the number of samples (years), the lower the standard deviation, 
which reduces the chance of a “lucky” short term return.  The less likely a short-term strategy is to 
return a performance fee, the more likely a longer-term valuation-based investment strategy will be 
utilised by the fund manager (Cameron, 2008).   
 
It is therefore important that should a rolling return method of performance fee be used a suitable 
period of observation be used, which is considered to be a three year period as this would suit long 
                                                     





term investing, any period less would allow for short term investment strategies, any longer leaving 
the manager trapped with long forgotten poor performance.   
Crystallisation Periods 
 
High Water marks and Rolling period returns deal with the performance of the fund compared to the 
fee hurdle. A crystallization period is the specific time period, be it yearly, quarterly or monthly that the 
actual performance fee outperformance is measured. In accounting terminology it is the point at which 
the performance fee becomes an expense and not an accrual. In other words a liability the investor 
Fee caps  
 
Fee capping is most often referred to as the maximum total fee percentage that a manager may 
receive from fund performance; “it is the rate at which the manager no longer participates” 
(Schreuder, 2006). A fee cap is the point at which the fund’s performance exceeds its fee hurdle in 
excess so that the total fee charged on the investor reaches a predetermined maximum percentage. 
Once the fee cap has been reached the fund manager will no longer participate in any excess 
performance.   
 
A fee cap is much more likely to occur in a rolling measurement rather than a standard high water 
mark measurement, as the manager is forgiven more easily for a period of poor performance. A fee 
cap is of more concern to the investor when the measurement period is short (usually less than one 
year), as there is more likelihood of lucky short term performance profits being made. The longer the 
measurement period the less likely the need for a fee cap. Fee caps can also provide managers with 
an incentive to follow a more passive strategy. Once the maximum fee is reached, a manager can 
follow a more passive strategy to ensure that he locks in his fee (Still, 2009). 
Fee Reductions 
 
Should the fund return negative performance; there are instances where a base fee reduction can 
occur, as is the case in the United States with Fulcrum fees. Should a fund perform poorly and return 
negative performance or underperform its fee benchmark, there may be a fee structure in place where 
this results in the base fee being reduced in order to compensate the investor for this lost 
performance.   
 
However in South Africa, it is the exception rather than the norm if performance fee contracts include 
a clause whereby base fees are reduced during periods of under-performance. Fee reductions must 
not be confused with the practice where any negative performance is carried forward to offset any 
future over-performance. Ideally both these practices should exist in some form when performance 





be considered fair for the manager to partake in only upside performance with no form of penalty for 
periods of under-performance. 
Series accounting, equalisation 
Equalisation refers to an accounting methodology and ensures that the investment manager is paid 
the correct incentive, performance or profit sharing fee (Equalisation, S Flynn). This process allows 
fees to be fairly allocated between each investor in the fund. It is a calculation applied to subscriptions 
that is designed to equalize the fund manager and new investors coming in to a fund with regards to 
the payment of performance fees. With equalisation, the manager administers only one fee class, but 
a correction is made to the number of units allocated to joiners, and to the value of units bought back 
from leavers. Under-charging is avoided by awarding fewer units to investors who join while the fund 
is below a high-water mark. Over-charging can be avoided by awarding more units to investors who 
join while he fund is above a cap. Leavers are treated in a similar way, for example, by awarding more 
or less cash on leaving. Equalisation can be very costly to administer, given the additional information 
required for each and every cash-flow. Also, as for multiple fee classes, it can prove difficult to explain 
and to understand (Schreuder). 
 There are three main components referred to. They are: 
 
 The High Water Mark (HWM) - the highest NAV at which performance fees have been 
paid. 
 Gross NAV (GNAV) - The absolute value of the NAV, after adding back the cumulative 
performance fee accrual since the last time performance fees were paid. 
 Subscription NAV- The published NAV after deduction of paid and accrued performance 
fees. 
Typically only funds that are subject to high levels of volatility or funds where performance fees can 
have a significant impact on the NAV will put an equalisation policy in place. The equalisation policy 
should be documented in the offering documents. The following give examples of equalisation 
problems: 
A. The Free Ride 
 
The Free Ride was the original reason and justification for the introduction of equalization. It can be 
explained with the following example: 
 
Assume there are only two investors: investor A and investor B. Initially, investor A buys one share at 
R100. At the end of four months, the stock has risen to R110. This is the new high water mark. At the 
end of month five, the stock falls to R100. Investor B then buys one share for R100. If the NAV rises 





paying a performance fee on his profit. Equalization attempts to eliminate this by charging an 
incentive fee to investor B. 
 
Free ride 
  Investor A Investor B HMW 
1st Month 100 Buys 1 share   
2nd Month 104    
3rd Month 108    
4th Month 110   110 
5th Month 100  Buys 1 share  
Custom House Group (2000) 
 
B. Rising Share Price: 
 
Initially, investor A buys one share at R100. The NAV per share rises in the second month to R110. 
The NAV per share is then published at R108, net of 20% performance fee accrual. Investor B buys 
one share at R108. At quarter end, the GNAV per share has risen to R120. The gross profit is 
therefore R32, calculated as follows: investor A invested R100, and investor B invested R108. The 
total invested is R20. The GNAV at the end of the quarter is R240. The performance fee at 20% of 
R32 = R6.40 gross, or R3.20 per share. Therefore: investor A effectively pays a R3.20 fee on R20 
profit, which equals 16.4% of the profit made by investor A, whereas investor B effectively pays R3.20 
fee on a profit of R12, which equals 26.66% of the profit made by investor B. To be equitable, the 
profits should be allocated as R20 to investor A, and R12 to investor B who bought at R108, through 
equalisation. 
C. Claw Back Syndrome: 
 
Equalisation is necessary to avoid the Claw Back Syndrome. For example, investor A buys one share 
for R100 at launch. Initially, the GNAV rises to R110, i.e. R108 net of performance fee accrual. 
Investor B now buys one share at R108. The NAV of the fund is now R218 excluding performance fee 
accrual. At the end of the month the NAV per share falls back to R96. Given that the fund loss is R13 
per share (total fund loss of R26), the fair value of investor A’s investment would be R97 (R110 – 
R13) whereas the fair value for investor B would be R95 (R108 – R13). The actual loss to investor A 
is R14 (R110 – R96), whereas the loss to investor B is actually R12 (R108 – 96). 
The performance fee accrual made at the end of the second month would now revert back to the 
fund. Without equalisation, that accrual would benefit all shareholders, including the new investor, 
whereas the original incentive fee accrual was only accrued in respect of investor A’s investment and 





R96, a loss of R14, whereas investor B benefits from an allocation from part of investor A’s 
performance fee accrual, to the value of R1, so that the NAV per share of his investment is now R96, 
a loss of only R12, instead of R95. Equalisation will eliminate this anomaly by reimbursing the 
accrued performance fee to investor A, who already “paid” for it. 
The following gives a description of equalisation methods for the above problems: 
D. Multi Series Method: 
 
This method is user-friendly and the simplest of all equalisation methods to understand. It requires the 
fund to issue a new series of units when new subscriptions are made. When calculating the NAV per 
share, the correct performance fee accruals are applied to each of the series separately. 
First Series: This is issued when fund is launched and known as the lead / initial series. The objective 
is to consolidate each of the subsequent series issued into the lead series at the end of every 
performance period. When a lead series does not pay a performance fee, the series that paid the 
performance fee will consolidate into the lead series. It is worth noting the following about this 
method: it is not possible to publish a single NAV per share as every series has their own NAV. The 
issue price of new series is determined between the investor and the fund. This can either be a fixed 
price or the GAV of the lead series. 
E. Other methods include: 
 
Equalisation Credits (when subscription NAV is > HWM): where credits are applied to new 
subscriptions – the amount of the subscription is reduced by the equalisation credit. The credit is 
applied to any subscriptions where the subscription NAV is higher than the HWM NAV. New 
shareholders compensate the existing shareholders for the performance fees already paid by them. 
At the next crystallisation date, the credit will be used to issue new shares to the investor who owns 
the credit. If the NAV is below the HWM the credit will dissolve into the fund as realised gains to the 
benefit of all the shareholders. The equalisation credit belongs to the new shareholders but sits on the 
balance sheet – usually called equalisation credit. 
Performance Fee Reserve (when subscription NAV is < HWM): The subscriber below HWM will pay a 
deposit upon subscription that pays potential performance fees up to the HWM NAV level. In this 
case, the deposit is calculated as the difference between the HWM NAV and the current subscription 
NAV multiplied by the performance fee rate. If the NAV returns to HWM, the deposit is paid to the 
manager as a performance fee. If the NAV remains below the HWM at the next performance fee 
payment date, the deposit remains as a provision or reserve on the balance sheet of the fund. It 
remains there until it is used fully in payment of performance fees to the manager. If the investor 
redeems before the provision is fully utilised (i.e. whilst the NAV is still below the HWM), a pro-rata 
adjustment may be made to the reserve for the difference between the redemption NAV and the 





investor as part of the redemption proceeds (Flynn, 2006). 
Many absolute return funds don’t make use of equalisation, due to the high numbers of subscriptions 
and redemptions, so it is common that an investor will pay a higher performance fee from the outset – 
a fee they are effectively paying for past performance. There are times when new investors come into 
the fund after a period of underperformance and pay a lower fee at the outset. This may not be 
equitable over the short term, however, over the long term and with the impact of variations in 
performance, fees normalize and long-term investors are treated fairly. If managers use a rolling 
return method of performance fee calculation, this can lead to a flaw: if the period is too long, there is 
an increasing chance that new investors pay performance fees for performances from which they 
have not benefitted, or exiting investors escape performance fees (time cross subsidisation effect); 
and if it is too short, this may encourage undue risk taking and a short- term investment strategy. 
Therefore, the period over which the manager’s performance is evaluated should be long enough that 
true skill is not obscured by short-run variability (Still, 2009). 
Investor Awareness 
 
With regards to the above concepts, an investor needs to be aware of the structure of performance 
fees. If an investor has decided to invest in a fund that charges performance fees, they need to ask 
themselves a number of important questions (Maguire, 2008): 
1. The managers chosen hurdle must be high enough to represent a superior performance when 
it is achieved. 
2. The base fee charged must be low and based on the managers actual costs. Poor 
performance must not be profitable, but neither should it force the asset manager out of 
business. 
3. Consider the performance benchmark. Does it truly reflect the manager’s universe of 
investible stocks and the limits imposed on his ability to invest? 
4. The managers and shareholders’ interests should be symmetrically aligned, on both the 
upside and downside. Managers should refund fees at the same rate when underperforming 
the hurdle. 
5. The nature of the performance fee should encourage a long-term investment perspective. 
6. An investor should not be charged fees for historic performance (there should be 
equalisation). 
7. The fees should not be based on fixed periods, as it encourages risk-taking and allows the 
manager to “wipe the slate clean”. They should instead be based on perpetual rolling returns 
from the date of initial investment. 
8. Performance fees should be gradually built up and not immediately drawn by the manager, 





Fund Manager Awareness 
 
The establishment of a performance fee is an important consideration for any investment company 
and fund manager. Grant Thornton’s 2008 presentation Performance Fees a Question of Purpose 
suggest a number of important concepts that must be considered before a fund should implement a 
performance fee structure, these included:  
 
1. Have the fund objectives clear before you start, understand what is meant by performance? 
Understand what shareholders expect as to style, risk, volatility and performance? 
2. Consider the performance benchmark. Does it truly reflect the universe of investible stocks 
and the limits imposed on investments? 
3. A relative fee related to an index may well pay a performance fee in a falling market. Is that 
accepted? Can you explain that convincingly to retail shareholders? Or would shareholders 
appreciate an absolute floor? 
4. Will the structure of the fee reflect performance, risk and fair manager reward? Does the 
company get value for money? 
5. How far might you want a truly symmetrical fee – negative as well as positive? 
6. Try to keep the performance fee fairly simple – or at least express the underlying principles 
clearly. What are you trying to achieve and what are your expectations of the manager? 
7. Model major out or underperformances. Model high watermarks and caps. Contrast rolling 
and annual calculations.  
8. Do you mean arithmetic or geometric performance? 
9. Try setting it out graphically so that members of the board feel comfortable with the idea. 
10. Keep the lawyers under control: huge agreements with lots of formulae cause headaches. 
Building an agreement out of concrete bricks may suit static mathematicians, but may not 
reflect purpose. The accompaniment of a simple English explanation of what was intended is 
a good idea. 
11. Find out specifically how your ideas, or the management company’s ideas, will benefit your 
fund manager and his or her support team. 
12. Watch out for wrinkles: for example, performance might best be measured on the excess after 
charging rather than before charging the performance fee. Do you always want performance 
on net assets per share? Base fee on gross assets per share? Excluding buy-backs? Fully 
diluted? 
13. Consider whether some element of share price return or discount level could (or should) be 
included in the calculations. A pure share price related fee has attractions for the shareholder, 
but it is not relevant to the manager’s efforts. On the other hand, an element of the fee related 
to the discount – for example, a reduction applied to the payable value of the fee if the 
discount widened in some way – might stimulate the manager’s marketing. 
14. Explain in the report and accounts how the performance fee is being earned and what the 





15. Will the structure of the fee reflect performance and reward the manager fairly? Will the 
company get value for money? Consider if: 
• The manager should be required to make good underperformance before a further 
outperformance fee is paid 
• A cap may not be necessary, unless some ‘blow out’ can be envisaged 
• Would an underlying absolute hurdle help to reflect the required risk return for 
investors? 







Data and Methodology 
 
South African unit trusts are required by the Collective Incentive Schemes Act to disclose their 
performance fee methodology; I have used the fund fact sheets and the asset manager FAQ as a 
means of obtaining the data required for assessing the structure of South African performance fees. 
As the South African CIS market is dominated by a few number of large asset managers, all 
performance fee research has been based on the 15 largest asset managers. This translates into 555 
CIS or R1.2 trillion. I have looked at only South African domiciled funds.15 
Results and Analysis  
Performance Fee – Total   
 
A fund manager can elect to either charge an investor a fixed percentage fee or fees can be linked to 
the CIS performance. The first level of analysis looked at is whether a fund charges some form of 
performance fee. In order to get a clearer understanding for the analysis both the actual number of 
funds identified and the value of the assets held in the funds have been looked at.  
 
Based on the top 15 fund managers in the South African tier one domicile, the results are as follows:  
 
Fund Value: 34%16 of the assets under administration are subject to some form of performance fee 
charge.  
 
Number of Funds: 25%17 of the funds are subjected to some form of performance fee 
 
                                                     
15 Worldwide, global and regional funds have been excluded for this analysis. 
16 This is R425m of the R1 237m assets applicable to this classification 











Performance Fee - Overall CIS funds





This is slightly higher than the 20% quoted by the National Treasury’s estimation of South African unit 
trusts (Charges in South African retirement funds, July 2013). The number of CIS that charge a 
performance fee in the South African market is significantly higher than both the United States 
(3.7%18) and United Kingdom (3%19) 
 
Using the entire South African CIS market is a good starting point, but in order to gain a more 
valuable understanding of performance fees in South African CIS’s it is useful to follow a top down 
approach and look the second tier of fund classification the asset allocation. The figure below gives us 
a breakdown of the percentage of CIS that charge performance fees based on the ASISA tier two 
classifications (Equity, Interest bearing, Multi Asset and Real estate).  The results are shown as a 




Based on the results Interest bearing and Real estate CIS’s have almost no funds that charge a 
performance-based fee.  However, for the number of Equity and Multi Asset Funds the split is more 
equally shared between fixed and performance based fees. The interesting observation from the 
above result is that those funds that are not exposed to equity investments do not look to construct 
any form of performance fee based compensation.  
 
                                                     
18 Kim, 2011 
19 Moisson 2012 





Performance fees received by Multi Asset Funds are almost entirely as a result of the General Equity 
Funds who charge performance fees, with 37% of funds and 58% of assets in this sector charging a 
performance fee.  
 
 
The South African equity sector has a more dispersed performance fee showing with most of the 
equity portfolios having a high level of performance based fees, the highest being Flexible funds and 
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Performance Fee – Asset Manager  
 
The selection of a performance fee is the responsibility of the fund manager with the guidance of the 
asset management firm. Of the top 15 asset managers in South Africa only Foord and Allan Gray 
have greater than 50% of their funds with performance fee structures in place. This is a strong 
indication that the adoption of performance fees is not widespread across all asset managers, but 
rather on a sector basis.    
 
  *See appendix 5.1 for the breakdown for Asset value 
Performance Fee for Single Strategy and Funds of Funds 
The table below shows the take up of performance fees based on whether they are direct investment, 
known as Single Strategy Funds (SSF) or Funds of Funds (FoF). The split based on number of funds 
choosing a performance fee is relatively similar with 23% and 28% respectively. For the value of the 
funds the split is far more uneven with SS funds holding 36% (not far from the total value) but FoF 
have a far lower 17%. This is an indication that the large asset FoF have a preference for non-
performance fee funds. 
























Sharing Rates  
 
Once a performance fee has been elected a sharing or participation rate is selected. Based on the 
137 funds that have performance fee structures in place the most common being that of 15%21 with 
56 of the total funds.  
 
 
As the Equity and Multi Asset sectors are the two significant performance fee electors a more 
appropriate analysis is of just these two sectors. This show the Multi Asset funds tend towards a lower 
sharing rate with 83% of this category electing a sharing rate of 15% or lower. Compared to Equity 
funds of which only 45% have a sharing rate below 15%.  
 
                                                     





 Fund Value Number of Funds









The period of measurement used for comparing the fee hurdle to that of the actual performance of the 
CIS can either take the form of a rolling method or a HWM structure. For the South African CIS 
industry a rolling period measurement is the preferred method with over 75% of funds electing to take 





Of the 100 funds that elected a rolling period of measurement 53 chose to have their performance 
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that with the exception of 5 funds the suggested period of 36 months (3 years) has not been followed. 
This would suggest that South African CIS have the ability to be rewarded for short-term “lucky” 




A breakdown of the rolling measurement periods per the fund classification is provided in appendix 
5.2. This highlights that the vast majority of the funds that have short term rolling measurement 
periods are those of the Equity – General Funds.  
Performance Fee Hurdle 
 
Performance fee hurdles should be based on a funds benchmark of performance. This benchmark 
should capture the market that the fund is investing into. For South African CIS these markets are 
based on the following market indices, South African All Bond Index (ALBI), South African Consumer 
Price Inflation (CPI), South African Reserve Bank Repo rate (SARB Repo), Short Term Fixed Interest 
composite index (Stefi) and the Johannesburg Securities Index22 (JSE).  
 
For South African CIS benchmarks nearly all are driven by at least one of these market indices in 
some form, be it directly or through a benchmark of mixed indices. The most common being that of 
CPI with 40% of the funds tested having some direct form of CPI in their performance fee hurdle.  
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As CPI is an index that tracks inflation it can be thought of as a measure of zero economic growth. A 
fund that returns only CPI would be considered to have not provided the investor with any added 
value. Considering this hurdle is applied before fees an investor would be earning a negative real 
return should their portfolio only return that of the CPI index. In the case of South African CIS however 
nearly all the funds (97%) have some form of CPI + and addition fixed percentage in place, 93% have 
a fixed percentage greater than 2%.  
 
Appendix 5.6 gives a breakdown of the fee hurdles presented for each CIS alongside there 
recommended ASISA 
Fee Hurdle vs CIS Benchmark 
 
Performance fees are an attempt to align the fund manager’s incentives with that of the investor. It is 
a compensation structure that allows a fund manager to be rewarded for the gains they provide to the 
investor.   
 
In the case of funds having a performance fee hurdle that does not match that of its benchmark, a 
fund manager may be rewarded for performance even though they have not added any true gains23. 
As already discussed, a measure of the risk adjusted returns is the alpha of a fund. As the alpha of a 
fund is based on the excess returns to that of the funds benchmark a fund having a performance 
                                                     





hurdle that is less than that of the benchmark allows the fund manager to receive compensation even 
when the fund adds no value (a negative alpha).  
 
South African CIS that charge performance fees mostly follow the acceptable convention of having a 
performance hurdle that matches that of their benchmarks, with 81% of the funds studied. There are 
however 25 funds that have performance fee hurdles that do not match that of their benchmark. 





The crystalisation of a performance fee can either be on monthly, quarterly or yearly basis. In South 
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A performance fee gives the fund manager the potential to earn a larger TER. A fee cap is 
established at a certain percentage where a TER fee is maximized and the fund can no longer charge 
more than this. A large number of South African CIS (83%) have some predetermined maximum fee, 





South African CIS are a popular form of investment not only as they provide an individual investor a 
platform to have their investment actively managed by a professional fund manager but also allow the 
investor to pool their funds to reduce the high barrier cost to trading, that would be experienced 
should they attempt to recreate their own portfolio. In return a CIS will charge the investor a number of 
fees in order to receive compensation for the management of the investment. One such fee structure 
is that of a performance based fee, in which the investor will pay a certain portion of their fee based 
on the performance of their investment. The logic being that this will ensure that both parties have 
aligned interests and that the fund manager will have a tangible incentive to ensure that they provide 
the best possible returns to his investors.  
 
This paper has focused on two questions regarding South African CIS: 
 
• Has the CIS elected a Performance Fee? 
• If so, what structure has been used for this fee calculation? 
 
From the research done the results show that the South African CIS industry is dominated by funds 
that do not charge a variable fee percentage, with only 25% of funds and 34% of asset in the entire 
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regulated South African CIS industry having a performance fee structure. The Equity (General), Multi 
Asset (Flexible), Multi Asset (High Equity) and Multi Asset (Low Equity) being the four categories 
showing the largest take up of a performance fee.  The trend for accepting a performance fee 
compensation structure is therefore based on the fund having a nonspecific industry mandate that is 
equity based.  
 
As performance fees can vary in their structure significantly a situation may arise where two funds can 
provide exactly the same returns but based on their performance fee structure, after fee returns can 
differ significantly. This paper has looked at the differing sharing rates, performance fee hurdles, 
measurement periods, crystalisation periods and total fee caps. By providing a catalogue for which 
each CIS performance fee structure can be analysed and compared to others, this research hopes to 
help promote the issue that a fund manager can act in a negative manner in arranging their 
performance fee structure so as to disadvantage their investors. This would include fee hurdles that 
do not match their benchmarks, short periods of performance evaluation, no maximum fee and high 
sharing rates.  
 
The disclosure of a Total Expense ratio (TER) for CIS is well established in all CIS marketing 
information. A TER with a performance fee component is also included in the disclosure, however it is 
the actual performance fee structure and potential performance fee return that is not transparent to 
investors. The ASISA guidelines on fund disclosure attempt to clarify this with their compulsory FAQ 
on performance fees, but it has been my experience writing this paper that although compulsory to 
provide, a number of fund managers have made little effort to provide this information in a transparent 
and user-friendly manner. It would therefore be reasonable to assume that any unsophisticated 
investor would not be able to interoperate or even discover the performance fee structure of their CIS.  
 
It would be my recommendation that the South African CIS industry with the management of ASISA 
have more stringed regulation regarding the structure of performance fees. Funds should not be left to 
establish their own set of rules regarding the fee hurdle, in particular a fee hurdle should not be 
allowed to fall below that of the funds publicised benchmark.  As funds differ considerably between 
asset classifications it would be my recommendation that those funds that follow sector specific 
mandates have standardised structures, while those who operate in more general investment classes 
have their structures assessed and compared to funds of like investment mandates (risk 
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Appendix 1.1 – Performance fee Options, Lee base case parameters.  
Item Base Case Parameters 
Performance Objective Excess return = 1.6% per annum, tracking error 3.2% per annum  
Base Fee 10 basis points  
Bonus Formula  20 basis points per 1% net excess return (after threshold equal to base 
fee)  
Fee Maximum  80 bps 
Risk Penalty Rate  None 
Performance Period  Simple 1-year excess return 
Discount Rate  7%. For calculating annualized expected PV of fees.  
Benchmark Performance  Return: 8% per annum, volatility: 12% per annum 
Excess Return Correlation to 
Benchmark Return  
0 
Excess Return Autocorrelation  Autocorrelation is the correlation returns between two subsequent 
periods. It is a measure of “trends” in the excess portfolio return  
Number of Simulations 10 000 
Simulation Period  10 Years 
 
Appendix 1.2 – Performance fee option valuation, Simulation Analysis of Performance based 







Appendix 2 – South African CIS Fund Classifications. 
2.1 Equity Portfolios:  
 
These portfolios invest a minimum of 80% of the market value of the portfolios in equities 
and generally seek maximum capital appreciation as their primary goal.  
 
2.1.1 Equity – General portfolios - These portfolios invest in selected shares across all 
industry groups as well as across the range of large, mid and smaller cap shares. While the 
managers of these portfolios may subscribe to different investment styles or approaches, 
their intent is to produce a risk/return profile that is comparable with the risk/return profile of 
the overall JSE equities market. The portfolios in this category offer medium to long-term 
capital growth as their primary investment objective.  
SA Benchmark: FTSE/JSE All Share index (J203T)  
 
2.1.2 Equity – Large cap portfolios – These portfolios invest at least 80% of the market 
value of the portfolios in large market capitalisation shares which have a market 
capitalisation greater than or equal to the company with the lowest market capitalisation in 
the FTSE/JSE Top 40 Index, or an appropriate foreign index published by an exchange. 
100% of share purchases must be in this investable universe at time of purchase.  
SA Benchmark: FTSE/JSE Top 40 index (J200T)  
 
2.1.3 Equity – Mid & Small cap portfolios – These portfolios invest at least 80% of the 
market value of the portfolios in shares which have a market capitalisation smaller than the 
company with the lowest market capitalisation in the FTSE/JSE Top 40 Index, or an 
appropriate foreign index published by an exchange. 100% of share purchases must be in 
this investable universe at time of purchase. Due to both the nature and focus of these 
portfolios, they may be more volatile than portfolios that are diversified across the broader 
market.  
SA Benchmark: FTSE/JSE Mid Cap index (J201T)  
 
2.1.4 Equity - Resources portfolios – These portfolios invest at least 80% of the market 
value of the portfolios in shares listed in the FTSE/JSE Oil & Gas and Basic Materials 
industry groups or in a similar sector of an international stock exchange. Up to 10% of a 
portfolio may be invested in shares outside the defined sectors in companies that conduct 
similar business activities as those in the defined sectors. Due to both the nature and focus 
of these portfolios, they may be more volatile than portfolios that are diversified across a 
wider range of FTSE / JSE industry groups.  






2.1.5 Equity – Financial portfolios - These portfolios invest at least 80% of the market 
value of the portfolios in shares listed in the FTSE/JSE Financials industry group or in a 
similar sector of an international stock exchange. Up to 10% of a portfolio may be invested in 
shares outside the defined sectors in companies that conduct similar business activities as 
those in the defined sectors. Due to both the nature and focus of these portfolios they may 
be more volatile than portfolios that are diversified across a wider range of FTSE / JSE 
industry groups.  
SA Benchmark: FTSE/JSE Financials index (J580T)  
 
2.1.6 Equity – Industrial portfolios – These portfolios invest at least 80% of the market 
value of the portfolios in industrial shares listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange or in a 
similar sector of an international stock exchange. Industrial shares include all companies 
listed on the JSE other than those shares listed in the FTSE / JSE Oil & Gas, Basic 
Materials, and Financials industry groups.  
SA Benchmark: FTSE/JSE All Share Industrials index (J257T)  
 
2.1.7 Equity – Unclassified portfolios - These portfolios invest in a single industry or 
sector or in companies that share a common theme or activity as defined in their respective 
mandates. Due to both the nature and focus of these portfolios, they may be more volatile 
than portfolios that are diversified across the broader market. The performance of these 
portfolios cannot be compared to others in this category. Should it be considered 
appropriate, where five or more portfolios focus on a particular theme a new category will be 
created and the funds transferred.  
 
2.2 Multi Asset Portfolios:  
Multi Asset portfolios are portfolios that invest in a wide spread of investments in the equity, 
bond, money and property markets to maximise total returns (comprising capital and income 
growth) over the long term.  
 
2.2.1 Multi Asset – Flexible portfolios - These portfolios invest in a flexible combination of 
investments in the equity, bond, money and property markets. The underlying risk and return 
objectives of individual portfolios may vary as dictated by each portfolio‟s mandate and 
stated investment objective and strategy. These portfolios may be aggressively managed 
with assets being shifted between the various markets and asset classes to reflect changing 
economic and market conditions and the manager is accorded a significant degree of 
discretion over asset allocation to maximise total returns over the long term.  
 
2.2.2 Multi Asset - High Equity portfolios - These portfolios invest in a spectrum of 
investments in the equity, bond, money, or property markets. These portfolios tend to have 
an increased probability of short term volatility, aim to maximise long term capital growth and 
can have a maximum effective equity exposure (including international equity) of up to 75% 
and a maximum effective property exposure (including international property) of up to 25% of 
the market value of the portfolio. The underlying risk and return objectives of individual 
portfolios may vary as dictated by each portfolios mandate and stated investment objective 
and strategy.  
 
2.2.3 Multi Asset - Medium Equity portfolios - These portfolios invest in a spectrum of 
investments in the equity, bond, money, or property markets. These portfolios tend to display 
average volatility, aim for medium to long term capital growth and can have a maximum 
effective equity exposure (including international equity) of up to 60% and a maximum 
effective property exposure (including international property) of up to 25% of the market 
value of the portfolio. The underlying risk and return objectives of individual portfolios may 






2.2.4 Multi Asset - Low Equity portfolios - These portfolios invest in a spectrum of 
investments in the equity, bond, money, or property markets. These portfolios tend to display 
reduced short term volatility, aim for long term capital growth and can have a maximum 
effective equity exposure (including international equity) of up to 40% and a maximum 
effective property exposure (including international property) of up to 25% of the market 
value of the portfolio. The underlying risk and return objectives of individual portfolios may 
vary as dictated by each portfolios mandate and stated investment objective and strategy.  
 
2.2.5 Multi Asset – Income portfolios – These portfolios invest in a spectrum of equity, 
bond, money market, or real estate markets with the primary objective of maximising 
income. The underlying risk and return objectives of individual portfolios may vary as 
dictated by each portfolios mandate and stated investment objective and strategy. These 
portfolios can have a maximum effective equity exposure (including international equity) of 
up to 10% and a maximum effective property exposure (including international property) of 
up to 25% of the market value of the portfolio.  
 
2.3 Interest Bearing Portfolios:  
Interest Bearing Portfolios are collective investment portfolios that invest exclusively in bond, 
money market investments and other interest earning securities.  
These portfolios may not include equity securities, real estate securities or cumulative 
preference shares.  
 
2.3.1 Interest Bearing - Variable Term portfolios – These portfolios invest in bonds, fixed 
deposits and other interest-bearing securities. These portfolios may invest in short, 
intermediate and long-dated securities. The composition of the underlying investments is 
actively managed and will change over time to reflect the manager’s assessment of interest 
rate trends. These portfolios offer the potential for capital growth, together with a regular and 
high level of income.  These portfolios may not include equity securities, real estate 
securities or cumulative preference shares  
SA Benchmark: JSE/ASSA All Bond index (ALBI)  
 
2.3.2 Interest Bearing – Short Term portfolios – These portfolios invest in bonds, fixed 
deposits and other interest earning securities which have a fixed maturity date and either 
have a predetermined cash flow profile or are linked to benchmark yields, but exclude any 
equity securities, real estate securities or cumulative preference shares. To provide relative 
capital stability, the weighted average modified duration of the underlying assets is limited to 
a maximum of two. These portfolios are less volatile and are characterised by a regular and 
high level of income.  
SA Benchmark: STeFI Composite index  
 
2.3.3 Interest Bearing - Money market portfolios - These portfolios seek to maximise 
interest income, preserve the portfolio‟s capital and provide immediate liquidity. This is 
achieved by investing in money market instruments with a maturity of less than thirteen 
months while the average duration of the underlying assets may not exceed 90 days and a 
weighted average legal maturity of 120 days. The portfolios are typically characterised as 
short-term, highly liquid vehicles.  
SA Benchmark: STeFI 3-month index  
 
2.4 Real Estate Portfolios:  
 
Real Estate - General portfolios – These portfolios invest in listed property shares, 
collective investment schemes in property and property loan stock and real estate 
investment trusts. The objective of these portfolios is to provide high levels of income and 
long-term capital appreciation. These portfolios invest at least 80% of the market value of the 





international stock exchange and may include other high yielding securities from time to 
time. Up to 10% of a portfolio may be invested in shares outside the defined sectors in 
companies that conduct similar business activities as those in the defined sectors.  
SA Benchmark: FTSE/JSE SA Listed Property index (J253T)  
 
 

























Appendix 4.1 - Performance fee FAQ for CIS as per the ASISA standard on Collective 
investment Scheme Performance fees.  
• What are the minimum fees for the relevant funds and classes? 
• What are the maximum fees for the relevant funds and classes? 
• At which performance levels (also called the fee hurdles) will the Manager charge 
more than the minimum fees? 
• Are the fee hurdles the same as the relevant fund benchmarks? If not, explain any 
differences and the reason for this. 
• Will more than the minimum fee be charged regardless of whether the fund is 
experiencing positive or negative performance? 
• What portion of the funds’ performances will the Manager be entitled to share, 
should the funds perform above their fee hurdles (also called the sharing rate)? 
• When fund performance is considered, are fees included or excluded (net of fees or 
gross of fees)? 
• What fee rate will be charged under the following conditions: 
o the funds perform 10% pa less than Benchmark 
o the funds perform 5% pa less than Benchmark 
o the funds perform in line with Benchmark 
o the funds perform 5% pa more than Benchmark 
o the funds perform 10% pa more than Benchmark 
• Do any other classes of the funds charge fixed fees instead of performance fees?  
• Are the performance fees accrued daily (also called the Fee Accrual Frequency)? If 
not, disclose the accrual frequency, together with the following “Where fees are not 
accrued daily, certain unit holders may carry a lower proportion of the performance 
fee relative to performance enjoyed, whilst other investors may carry a higher 
proportion of the performance fee relative to performance enjoyed.” _ 
• Do performance fee accruals pertain to performance periods more than a month 
prior to accrual? If so disclose the accrual lag, together with the following: “Where 
fee accrual is lagged, certain unit holders may carry a lower proportion of the 
performance fee relative to performance enjoyed, whilst other investors may carry a 
higher proportion of the performance fee relative to performance enjoyed.” 
• Is a rolling measurement period used? If so disclose the rolling period, together with 
the following “Where rolling measurement periods are used, certain unit holders 
may carry a lower proportion of the performance fee relative to performance 
enjoyed, whilst other investors may carry a higher proportion of the performance 
fee relative to performance enjoyed."  
• How often is the performance fee paid to the Manager (also called the “Fee Payment 
Frequency”)? 
• Should the fund experience under-performance to the fee hurdle, how long is that 
under-performance held against the Manager? In particular, at what point would 
that under-performance be written off from a fee calculation point of view? This 
“write off” may be the consequence of a reset provision in the High Water Mark, the 
length of the rolling period, or another implication of the mechanics of the 





• Does performance in excess of the hurdle need to overcome prior under-
performance (also called a High Water Mark system)? If so, explain whether fee 
accruals are simply suspended or whether past fee accruals are refunded. Also, 
disclose the circumstances under which the High Water Mark expires, if at all. 
• Do any underlying funds charge implicit performance fees? If so, include the 
following: “Where underlying funds charge implicit performance fees (i.e. implicit in 
their unit prices), unit holders may carry these performance fees regardless of 
whether the top tier fund or mandate has outperformed its own benchmark.” 
 
 














































































































































































































































































Fund Name Performance Benchmark Fee Hurdle
Absa Select Equity FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) Benchmark + 2%
Allan Gray Balanced - A AVG (market value weighted) of Domestic - Asset                   Benchmark - 5%
Allan Gray Equity - A FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) Benchmark - 15%
Allan Gray Stable - A
return of call deposits (for amounts greater than 
R5m) with FNB + 2% after tax of 25%
Return of call deposits (for amounts greater 
than R5m) with FNB + 2% after tax of 25%]- 5%
AS Forum MET Moderate FoF CPI + 5% CPI + 3%
BJM Multi-Manager Equity - B1 FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) ACI Domestic General Equity category
BJM Multi-Manager Prudential Flexible - B1
Median of the Domestic Prudential Variable 
Equity Fund Sector
average of the ACI Domestic Asset Allocation 
Prudential Variable Equity
Clarus MET Optimal - A FTSE JSE Top 40 J200T CPI+ 5%
Clarus MET Property - A J254 J254 less 5%
Clarus MET Real Income - A CPI+1.5% CPI+1%
Clarus MET Value - A FSTE JSE All Share Index
(J203T) CPI + 2.5%
GFA MET Stable FoF CPI + 5% CPI + 3%
Investec Active Quants - A FTSE/JSE SWIX (J403T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Investec Active Quants - R FTSE/JSE SWIX (J403T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Investec Equity - A FTSE/JSE SWIX (J403T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Investec Opportunity - R Headline CPI + 6% Headline CPI + 2%
Nedgroup Inv Flexible Income - A 110% of stefi call index total positive performance
Nedgroup Inv Stable - A1 CPI + 4% total positive performance
Old Mutual Active Quant Equity - A FTSE/JSE SWIX (J403T) Benchmark - 2%
Old Mutual Growth - A FTSE/JSE SWIX (J403T) Benchmark - 2%
Old Mutual Investors - A FTSE/JSE SWIX (J403T) Benchmark - 2%
Old Mutual Top Companies - A FTSE/JSE SWIX (J403T) Benchmark - 2%
STANLIB Balanced - A
60% FTSE/JSE All Share Index, 25% BEASSA All 
Bond Index, 9% MSCI World Index, 6% JP Morgan 
Global Government Bond Index
performance exceeds the performance 
median in the particular ACI Portfolio 
Classification Category and outperforms 
money market returns (measured by the SteFI 
Composite Index
STANLIB Growth - A FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Performance exceeds the performance 
median in the particular ACI Portfolio 
Classification Category and outperforms 
money market returns (measured by the SteFI 
Composite Index
STANLIB Value - A FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Performance exceeds the performance 
median in the particular ACI Portfolio 
Classification Category and outperforms 






































Fund Manager Fund Name Main Sector Sector
Absa Absa Select Equity Equity General Funds
Sanlam BJM Multi-Manager Equity - B1 Equity General Funds
Foord Foord Equity - R Equity General Funds
Investment Solutions Investment Solutions M-M Equity FoF Equity General Funds
MET CI Lion of Africa MET Equity Equity General Funds
Sanlam Lynx Opportunities FoF - A1 Equity General Funds
PSG PSG Equity - A Equity General Funds
Stanlib STANLIB Growth - A Equity General Funds
Stanlib STANLIB M-M All Stars Equity FoF - A Equity General Funds
Stanlib STANLIB Value - A Equity General Funds
MET CI Centaur MET Flexible Multi Asset Flexible Funds
MET CI Insight Capital MET Flexible FoF Multi Asset Flexible Funds
Prescient Prescient Private Clients Flexible - A1 Multi Asset Flexible Funds
PSG PSG Flexible Multi Asset Flexible Funds
MET CI Visio MET Actinio Multi Asset Flexible Funds
Sanlam BJM Multi-Manager Prudential Flexible - B1 Multi Asset High Equity Funds
Foord Foord Balanced - R Multi Asset High Equity Funds
Investment Solutions Investment Solutions Real Return Focus Multi Asset High Equity Funds
Sanlam Lynx Balanced FoF - A1 Multi Asset High Equity Funds
Stanlib STANLIB Balanced - A Multi Asset High Equity Funds
Allan Gray Allan Gray Optimal - A Multi Asset Low Equity Funds
Sanlam Lynx Cautious FoF - A1 Multi Asset Low Equity Funds
Investment Solutions Investment Solutions Income Interest Bearing Short Term Funds
Investment Solutions Investment Solutions Pure Fixed Interest Interest Bearing Variable Term Funds 






Appendix 5.5 – Performance fee Benchmarks per tier 3 classification  


































































































































Main Secto Sector Fund Manager Fund Name Hurdle Group Performance Fee Hurdle ASISA Benchmark
Equity  General Funds Sanlam BJM Multi-Manager Equity - B1 Other ACI Domestic General Equity category FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds Allan Gray Allan Gray Equity - A FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) - 15% FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds MET CI Clarus MET Value - A CPI CPI + 2.5% FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds MET CI Clarus MET Optimal - A CPI CPI+5% FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds Stanlib STANLIB M-M All Stars Equity FoF - A Other Domestic Equity General Micropal Sector Mean FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds Coronation Coronation Equity - A FTSE JSE SWIX (J403T) FTSE JSE SWIX (J403T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds Coronation Coronation Equity - R FTSE JSE SWIX (J403T) FTSE JSE SWIX (J403T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds Old Mutual Old Mutual Active Quant Equity - A FTSE JSE SWIX (J403T) FTSE JSE SWIX (J403T) - 2% FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds Old Mutual Old Mutual Growth - A FTSE JSE SWIX (J403T) FTSE JSE SWIX (J403T) - 2% FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds Old Mutual Old Mutual Investors - A FTSE JSE SWIX (J403T) FTSE JSE SWIX (J403T) - 2% FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds Old Mutual Old Mutual Top Companies - A FTSE JSE SWIX (J403T) FTSE JSE SWIX (J403T) - 2% FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds Old Mutual Old Mutual Value - A FTSE JSE SWIX (J403T) FTSE JSE SWIX (J403T) - 2% FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds MET CI Verso MET SA Equity FTSE JSE SWIX (J403T) FTSE JSE SWIX J403T FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds MET CI 36ONE MET Equity FTSE JSE SWIX (J403T) FTSE JSE SWIX J403T index FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds Investec Investec Active Quants - A FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds Investec Investec Active Quants - R FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds Investec Investec Equity - A FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds Investec Investec Equity - R FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds Investec Investec Growth - A FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds Investec Investec Growth - B FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds Investec Investec Growth - R FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds Investec Investec Value - A FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds Investec Investec Value - R FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds MET CI Lion of Africa MET Equity FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds MET CI Select Manager MET Equity FoF FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds PSG PSG Equity - A FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds Sanlam Lynx Opportunities FoF - A1 FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds Sanlam SIM General Equity - A FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds Sanlam SIM Value FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds Sanlam SIM Top Choice Equity - A1 FTSE JSE SWIX (J403T) FTSE/JSE SWIX (97%), Stefi (3%) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds Momentum Momentum Equity - A FTSE JSE SWIX (J403T) FTSE/JSE SWIX Index FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds MET CI N-e-FG MET Equity FTSE JSE SWIX (J403T) FTSE/JSE SWIX J403T FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds Momentum Momentum Value - A FTSE JSE SWIX (J403T) FTSE/JSE SWIX J403T FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds Prudential Prudential Dividend Maximiser - A Other General equity Unit trust mean return FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds Prudential Prudential Equity - A Other General equity Unit trust mean return FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds Stanlib STANLIB Growth - A Other
Performance exceeds the performance median 
in the particular ACI Portfolio Classification 
Category and outperforms money market 
returns (measured by the SteFI Composite 
Index FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds Stanlib STANLIB Value - A Other
Performance exceeds the performance median 
in the particular ACI Portfolio Classification 
Category and outperforms money market 
returns (measured by the SteFI Composite 
Index FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds Absa Absa Select Equity FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) + 2% FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds Coronation Coronation Top 20 - A FTSE/JSE Top 40 Index (J200) FTSE/JSE Top 40 Index FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity  General Funds Foord Foord Equity - R FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T) FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203T)
Equity Large Cap Funds MET CI Saffron MET Top 20 - A FTSE JSE SWIX (J403T) FTSE/JSE SWIX40 J400T FTSE/JSE Top 40 index (J200T) 
Interest 
Bearing Variable Term Funds 
 Allan Gray Allan Gray Bond - A ALBI JSE/ASSA All Bond index (ALBI) JSE/ASSA All Bond index (ALBI) 
Multi AssetFlexible Funds MET CI Centaur MET Flexible Mixed 15% Resi J258, 65% Findi J250, 20% Repo None Given
Multi AssetFlexible Funds MET CI Insight Capital MET Flexible FoF Mixed
50% FTSE JSE ALSI J203
& 50% SARB Repo Rate None Given
Multi AssetFlexible Funds MET CI 4i MET Opportunity - A Mixed 70% FTSE/JSE AlSI J203T None Given
Multi AssetFlexible Funds Prescient Prescient Private Clients Flexible - A1 Mixed
75% FTSE/JSE Shareholder Weighted All Share 
Index (SWIX) Total Return + 25% Cash (Stefi) None Given
Multi AssetFlexible Funds Prescient Bateleur Flexible Prescient - A1 CPI CPI None Given
Multi AssetFlexible Funds Sanlam SIM Managed Conservative FoF - A1 CPI CPI + 2% None Given
Multi AssetFlexible Funds MET CI Kanaan MET Flexible FoF - A CPI CPI + 3% None Given
Multi AssetFlexible Funds Sanlam SIM Managed Cautious FoF - A1 CPI CPI + 3% None Given
Multi AssetFlexible Funds MET CI Dotport MET Flexible FoF CPI CPI + 3.5% None Given
Multi AssetFlexible Funds MET CI RCI MET Flexible Managed - A CPI CPI + 4% None Given
Multi AssetFlexible Funds Old Mutual Old Mutual Flexible - A CPI CPI + 4% None Given
Multi AssetFlexible Funds MET CI BlueAlpha MET All Seasons CPI CPI + 5% None Given
Multi AssetFlexible Funds MET CI Celtis MET Flexible FoF - A CPI CPI + 6% None Given
Multi AssetFlexible Funds MET CI N-e-FG MET Flexible CPI CPI + 6% None Given
Multi AssetFlexible Funds MET CI Simplisiti MET Flexible FoF CPI CPI + 6% None Given
Multi AssetFlexible Funds Momentum Momentum Flexible - A CPI CPI + 6% None Given
Multi AssetFlexible Funds MET CI Stringfellow MET Flexible FoF CPI CPI + 7% None Given
Multi AssetFlexible Funds Coronation Coronation Absolute - A CPI CPI +6% None Given
Multi AssetFlexible Funds MET CI Imalivest MET Flexible CPI CPI +6% None Given
Multi AssetFlexible Funds Sanlam SIM Managed Moderate FoF - A1 Mixed
FTSE/SWIX (37%), ALBI (25%), STEFi (17.5%), 
MSCI World Equity (7.5%), USD LIbor (7.5%) SA 
listed property (5%) None Given
Multi AssetFlexible Funds Sanlam SIM Managed Moderate Aggressive FoF - A1 Mixed FTSE/SWIX (45%), ALBI (30%), STEFi (15%), MSCI None Given
Multi AssetFlexible Funds MET CI 36ONE MET Flexible Opportunity SARB Repo Repo rate + 2% None Given
Multi AssetFlexible Funds MET CI GCI MET Flexible FoF SARB Repo SARB Repo + 2% None Given
Multi AssetFlexible Funds MET CI Visio MET Actinio Stefi SteFI+2% None Given
Multi AssetFlexible Funds MET CI Skyblue MET Solar Flexible FoF Stefi SteFI+5% None Given
Multi AssetFlexible Funds Sanlam SIM Managed Aggressive FoF - A1 Mixed
SWIX 45% | ALBI 12.5% | STeFi 17.5% | MSCI 
World Equity 10% | JPMorgan GBI 10% | SA 
Listed Property 5% None Given
Multi AssetHigh Equity Funds MET CI Ankh Prudential Mixed 60% FTSE ALSI (J203) 25% ALBI 15% Stefi None Given
Multi AssetHigh Equity Funds MET CI Southern Charter MET Growth FoF Mixed
60% FTSE JSE Swix
15% ALBI index
10% FTSE JSE Listed Property
0% SteFI
5% JPM INT Bond Index
10% MSCI World index None Given
Multi AssetHigh Equity Funds Sanlam BJM Multi-Manager Prudential Flexible - B1 Other
average of the ACI Domestic Asset Allocation 
Prudential Variable Equity None Given
Multi AssetHigh Equity Funds Allan Gray Allan Gray Balanced - A Other
AVG (market value weighted) of Domestic - 
Asset allocation -prudential medium equity 
catorgry and Domestic - Asset Allocation  - 
prudential variable equity )excluding Allan 
















Main Secto Sector Fund Manager Fund Name Hurdle Group Performance Fee Hurdle ASISA Benchmark
Multi AssetHigh Equity Funds Investec Investec Opportunity - R CPI CPI + 2% None Given
Multi AssetHigh Equity Funds Old Mutual Old Mutual Balanced - A CPI CPI + 2% None Given
Multi AssetHigh Equity Funds MET CI Kanaan MET Balanced FoF - A CPI CPI + 3% None Given
Multi AssetHigh Equity Funds MET CI Olympiad MET Managed FoF CPI CPI + 3% None Given
Multi AssetHigh Equity Funds MET CI Dotport MET Prudential FoF CPI CPI + 3.5% None Given
Multi AssetHigh Equity Funds MET CI Brackenham MET Managed CPI CPI + 4% None Given
Multi AssetHigh Equity Funds MET CI Simplisiti MET Managed Protector FoF CPI CPI + 4% None Given
Multi AssetHigh Equity Funds MET CI Warwick MET Managed FoF - A CPI CPI + 4% None Given
Multi AssetHigh Equity Funds MET CI GFA MET Managed FoF CPI CPI + 5% None Given
Multi AssetHigh Equity Funds MET CI Northstar MET Managed CPI CPI + 5% None Given
Multi AssetHigh Equity Funds Momentum Momentum Balanced - A CPI CPI + 5% None Given
Multi AssetHigh Equity Funds MET CI Sasfin MET Prudential CPI CPI + 6% None Given
Multi AssetHigh Equity Funds Sanlam Lynx Balanced FoF - A1 CPI CPI + 6% None Given
Multi AssetHigh Equity Funds MET CI AS Forum MET Aggressive FoF CPI CPI + 7% None Given
Multi AssetHigh Equity Funds Sanlam SIM Balanced - A Other
Mean of ASISA asset allocation prudential 
variable equity None Given
Multi AssetHigh Equity Funds Investec Investec Managed - A Other Peer Median None Given
Multi AssetHigh Equity Funds Investec Investec Managed - R Other Peer Median None Given
Multi AssetHigh Equity Funds Stanlib STANLIB Balanced - A Other
performance exceeds the performance median 
in the particular ACI Portfolio Classification 
Category and outperforms money market 
returns (measured by the SteFI Composite 
Index None Given
Multi AssetHigh Equity Funds MET CI GCI MET Balanced FoF SARB Repo SARB Repo + 2% None Given
Multi AssetHigh Equity Funds MET CI Select Manager MET Flexible Growth FoF - A Stefi Stefi + 4% None Given
Multi AssetHigh Equity Funds MET CI Skyblue MET Cumulus Moderate FoF Stefi SteFI+3% None Given
Multi AssetHigh Equity Funds Foord Foord Balanced - R Other The market value weighted average None Given
Multi AssetIncome Funds Sanlam SIM Active Income - A1 ALBI BEASSA ALBI (1-3) None Given
Multi AssetIncome Funds MET CI Simplisiti MET Income Plus FoF CPI CPI + 2% None Given
Multi AssetIncome Funds Momentum Momentum Positive Return - A CPI CPI + 2% None Given
Multi AssetIncome Funds MET CI Clarus MET Real Income - A CPI CPI+1% None Given
Multi AssetIncome Funds Nedgroup Nedgroup Inv Flexible Income - A Other total positive performance None Given
Multi AssetLow Equity Funds Allan Gray Allan Gray Stable - A Other
Return of call deposits (for amounts greater 
than R5m) with FNB + 2% after tax of 25%]- 5% None Given
Multi AssetLow Equity Funds MET CI Southern Charter MET Defensive FoF Mixed
42.5% FTSE JSE Swix
12.5% ALBI index
10% FTSE JSE Listed Property
20% SteFI
7.5% JPM INT Bond Index
7.5% MSCI World index None Given
Multi AssetLow Equity Funds MET CI Dotport MET Cautious FoF CPI CPI None Given
Multi AssetLow Equity Funds Old Mutual Old Mutual Stable Growth - A CPI CPI + 1% None Given
Multi AssetLow Equity Funds Investec Investec Cautious Managed - A CPI CPI + 2% None Given
Multi AssetLow Equity Funds MET CI AS Forum MET Cautious FoF CPI CPI + 3% None Given
Multi AssetLow Equity Funds MET CI Celtis MET Conservative FoF - A CPI CPI + 3% None Given
Multi AssetLow Equity Funds MET CI GFA MET Stable FoF CPI CPI + 3% None Given
Multi AssetLow Equity Funds MET CI N-e-FG MET Income Provider FoF CPI CPI + 3% None Given
Multi AssetLow Equity Funds MET CI Stringfellow MET Stable FoF CPI CPI + 3% None Given
Multi AssetLow Equity Funds MET CI Verso MET Secure Growth FoF - A CPI CPI + 3% None Given
Multi AssetLow Equity Funds Sanlam Lynx Cautious FoF - A1 CPI CPI + 3% None Given
Multi AssetLow Equity Funds Nedgroup Nedgroup Inv Stable - A CPI CPI + 4% None Given
Multi AssetLow Equity Funds MET CI S BRO MET Defensive FoF CPI CPI + 6% None Given
Multi AssetLow Equity Funds Allan Gray Allan Gray Optimal - A Other
return of call deposits (for amounts greater 
than R5m) with FNB None Given
Multi AssetLow Equity Funds MET CI Dinamika MET Conservative FoF SARB Repo SA Repo rate + 2% None Given
Multi AssetLow Equity Funds MET CI Ankh Stable - A SARB Repo SARB Repo plus 2% None Given
Multi AssetLow Equity Funds Old Mutual Old Mutual Capital Builder - A Other SBK call rate (>1mil) None Given
Multi AssetLow Equity Funds MET CI AIMS MET Real Income FoF Stefi Stefi None Given
Multi AssetLow Equity Funds MET CI GCI MET Stable FoF - A Stefi Stefi + 1% None Given
Multi AssetLow Equity Funds MET CI Skyblue MET Kimberlite Cautious FoF Stefi SteFI+1% None Given
Multi AssetLow Equity Funds Nedgroup Nedgroup Inv Stable - A1 Other total positive performance None Given
Multi AssetMedium Equity Funds 
 Old Mutual Old Mutual Dynamic Floor - A CPI CPI + 2% None Given
Multi AssetMedium Equity Funds 
 MET CI AS Forum MET Moderate FoF CPI CPI + 3% None Given
Multi AssetMedium Equity Funds 
 MET CI Southern Charter MET Balanced FoF CPI CPI + 3% None Given
Multi AssetMedium Equity Funds 
 Coronation Coronation SA Capital Plus - A CPI CPI + 3.5% None Given
Multi AssetMedium Equity Funds 
 Coronation Coronation Capital Plus - A CPI CPI + 4% None Given
Multi AssetMedium Equity Funds 
 MET CI S BRO MET Balanced FoF CPI CPI + 6% None Given
Multi AssetMedium Equity Funds 
 MET CI Baroque MET Moderato FoF CPI CPI +5% None Given
Multi AssetMedium Equity Funds 
 MET CI Foster MET Moderate FoF Stefi Stefi + 4% None Given
Real EstatesGeneral Funds MET CI Altre MET Real Return Property - B FTSE/JSE SA Listed Property index FTSE/JSE SA Listed Property index J253 FTSE/JSE SA Listed Property index 
Real EstatesGeneral Funds Sanlam BJM Multi-Manager Property - B1
FTSE/JSE SA Listed Property index 
(J253) FTSE/JSE SA Listed Property TR
FTSE/JSE SA Listed Property index 
J253
Real EstatesGeneral Funds MET CI Clarus MET Property - A FTSE/JSE Capped Property Index (J254) FTSE/JSE Capped Property Index - 5%
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